


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Human Capital, Slavery and Low Rates of Economic and Population Growth in Indonesia, 1600–1910

PETER BOOMGAARD

Introduction¹

In 1811 the slave-trade was banned in European controlled areas of Indonesia. Although officially abolished in the Netherlands Indies on 1 January 1860, slavery continued in most (about three-quarters) of what is now Indonesia as it was then free of Dutch rule. Only from around 1910 did Dutch colonial rule cover the entire region. Slavery also survived in many Dutch controlled areas of the Archipelago, in some regions until at least the 1940s. Some local peoples still distinguish between those of slave and those of non-slave ancestry. Nevertheless, after 1910 slavery was no longer a major issue among policy makers. This helps explain why, during the late colonial period, so few monographs were written on the topic, although possibly the reluctance of colonial civil servants to admit to its continued existence also played a role.

The first detailed study of slavery in Indonesia, by A.H. Ruibing, appeared in 1937, followed in 1950, shortly after independence, by Bruno Lasker's work on bonded people in South-East Asia that incorporated data on Indonesia. Interest in slavery in the region has recently grown. A volume edited by Anthony Reid that included a significant number of studies of Indonesia appeared in 1983, followed in the 1990s by three works similarly containing contributions on Indonesian regions.²

However, slavery in Indonesia has also featured in historical monographs on cities where slavery was prominent and for which there exist rich historical sources.³ Strangely, labour history, a subject those interested in slavery would intuitively turn to, turns out to be an almost empty category as far as Indonesia prior to 1870 is concerned, apart from the many studies on Java under the so-called Cultivation System. This might stem from the almost universally held supposition that Indonesians prior to 1870 were all peasants. Therefore most scholars dismissed 'labour', which they considered to apply chiefly to non-agricultural wage-labour, as a meaningful analytical category.⁴ Moreover, James Warren's classic work on piracy and slavery in the Sulu zone has unfortunately failed to

spark more interest in slavery from subsequent historians of piracy in the region.⁵

Although progress since the early 1980s has been slower than might have been expected, perhaps someone should now attempt to write a book-length monograph on slavery in Indonesia. In this article I present a number of pointers for such a study. Hypothetical in nature, and combining elements from my earlier publications with more recent insights, they are here presented for the first time as a coherent ‘model’ of Indonesian slavery in the Early Modern and Early Colonial Periods.

The Demand for Slaves

Most scholars hold that slavery in the Indonesian Archipelago predated the arrival of the Europeans. They also concur that during the period of the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (‘Dutch East India Company’, hereafter ‘VOC’) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that of the Dutch Colonial State (1800–1949), slaves were being employed in both the indigenous and the ‘Western’ sectors. Support for the existence of slavery prior to the arrival of Europeans is given by the Portuguese writer Tomé Pires who visited the Archipelago around 1515.⁶ He mentioned not only slaves, but also pirates or ‘sea-robbers’ who dominated the regional slave-trade, supplying slave markets in the Lesser Sundas (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa), Southwestern Sulawesi (Macassar, Bugis), along the coast of Sumatra, and to a lesser extent Java where slavery appears to have been more characteristic of coastal regions than of the interior.

This picture of an Indonesian Archipelago hardly touched by Western influence highlights a society in which slavery was important and sea-robbers furnished newly captured slaves, of Indonesian and foreign origin, for regional markets and for export. Moreover, the system remained surprisingly constant until the early nineteenth century with the exception of Java, where slavery almost disappeared outside the coastal cities between the visit of Pires in circa 1515 and the early seventeenth century: As around 1600, slaves accounted for probably 50 per cent of Java’s urban population, which in turn was not more than 3 per cent of the total population, only approximately 1.5 per cent of Java’s inhabitants were slaves.

What Pires did not tell us is what these slaves were being used for. Information is sparse for the period prior to 1600 and even after that date, most information derives from European sources, which concentrate on urban rather than rural areas. Nevertheless, this serves scholars well as slavery, in both European and indigenous areas, was very much an urban phenomenon. There is reasonable information about slavery in the indigenous cities of Aceh on Sumatra and Banten in Java, and also in the

cities of Batavia (now Jakarta) in Java and Ambon in the Moluccas, both of which were ruled by Europeans but populated in the main by indigenous peoples. In all probability about half the population of these cities consisted of slaves.

How were all these slaves employed? In Batavia and other ‘Dutch’ towns the VOC employed large numbers as carpenters (for both ships and houses), caulkers, blacksmiths, stonemasons, bricklayers, canon-foundry workers, and many other kinds of artisans. Slave numbers fluctuated, sometimes sharply, as when it was cheaper to hire labour, either slaves of other people or ‘free’ (voluntary) wage-labour, the Company sold a certain percentage of its slaves.

Although hired labour, termed ‘coolies’, are mentioned in the sources from the 1670s, it has too often been assumed that almost all labour for the indigenous aristocracy was *corvée* or statute labour (and that there was no free wage labour in Indonesia prior to 1870).⁷ In consequence, scholars have traditionally held that slavery played a minor role in Indonesian history and that Early Modern Indonesian society was dominated by landholding peasant-cultivators who either worked for themselves or as statute labourers for their rulers. However, as I have demonstrated in previous studies, this traditional view is clearly ahistorical.⁸

I here restrict myself to the systems of slave labour and serfdom. In Batavia, the private individuals from whom slaves were hired were often high-ranking VOC, or former VOC (*vrijburgers*), officials. The highest ranking and richest could own up to 300 slaves. However, even simple citizens and artisans often had six to ten slaves whom they hired out for a living. It is therefore clear that both the VOC, as a company, and its wealthier officials, had a vested interest in the existence and continuation of slave labour. As early as 1645 it was noted that neither the VOC nor the European community in the Archipelago could survive without slaves, while in 1757, more than a century later, it was argued that without slavery most inhabitants of the colony, whose capital consisted largely of newly enslaved people, would be ruined.⁹

From their arrival in the Archipelago, Europeans largely adopted indigenous forms of slavery, as they did many other forms of economic activity. The earliest Dutch and English records note the wealthy urban elite, comprising indigenous rulers, aristocrats, and foreign (Arabs, Indians, Chinese) merchants, often possessed hundreds of slaves. Many were employed as retainers and soldiers, but also in periods of peace there were numerous slaves, who were expected to generate an income for their masters, working as artisans (spinning and weaving), sharecroppers in their master’s fields, fishermen and, in the large ports, as prostitutes. Owners claimed a prearranged sum, the slave retaining the remainder of his or her earnings.

However, it is clear that some aristocrats kept slaves chiefly for status, rather than for their economic utility and some Europeans followed their example. This explains why, despite the fact that the wealthy often invested all their earnings in slaves, owners often failed to make the slaves pay for more than their own upkeep.¹⁰ Thus it was reported of Banten around 1600 that many lords were poor because of the many slaves they owned, while in 1689 the Governor-General was highly critical of those Europeans in Batavia who owned slaves purely for reasons of 'splendour, exuberance, pride and improper display of wealth'. From the nineteenth century there are many examples, from a variety of indigenous groups, of slave keeping for status.¹¹

As noted, slaves were not necessarily a sound economic investment. Not only did the wealthy have to house, clothe and feed fairly large numbers of retainers who possessed no productive function, but slaves could and did run away. In Batavia, Banten, Banda and Ambon they did so in reasonably large numbers. Slaves also experienced generally higher mortality rates than did the local population. Upon arrival, often after a long sea voyage, many were ill and malnourished. Most were prisoners of war, or had been purchased or sold themselves during a famine and/or epidemic, and were therefore in poor physical shape even prior to the voyage. Moreover, they were often imported into a new 'disease environment' to which, as they possessed no natural immunity, they proved highly vulnerable. Often miserably unhappy about their new situation, many committed suicide, murder, or ran riot – as frequently noted in the Batavia VOC *Daghregister* (Daily Journal).

However, slavery was not a uniquely urban phenomenon. Many slaves were employed in agriculture, often far from major population centres. This was the case on the islands of Ambon and Banda where, like many 'free' indigenous people, they cultivated respectively cloves and nutmeg for export and where slavery resembled closest New World slavery. Slave conditions were better in the Moluccas. Rulers, aristocrats and other *orang kaya* [rich people] in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Aceh, Padang, Jambi, Palembang, Lampung and Banjarmasin) employed slaves in the cultivation of pepper, an indigenous enterprise less well documented than nutmeg and clove production, but which generated a large and steady demand for slave labour. Slaves were also employed in mining, particularly gold and silver in Sumatra (Aceh, Padang) for, as elsewhere, whether under European or indigenous management, miners experienced high mortality rates and it proved extremely difficult to recruit free labour.

The investment of slave labour in these large export-orientated activities is no surprise. However, slaves were also employed in small-scale production for the local market. Probably only in the most egalitarian and/or

nomadic communities was slavery entirely absent.¹² However, sources are largely silent on this issue until the nineteenth century when new data emerged due to a combination of imperial expansion and the emergence of new perspectives on indigenous society, including the rise of ethnography as an academic discipline. Finally, quite large numbers of slaves were used as human sacrifices, an embarrassing topic for those who argue that Indonesian slavery was relatively benign. For instance, when headhunting expeditions proved unsuccessful, slaves were often sacrificed to the gods.¹³

Slaves, then, were used almost everywhere and for all kinds of activities, as domestic servants for rich and poor owners, in cultivating crops (their own and their owners'), and in more 'mobile' tasks, such as looking after livestock and collecting non-timber forest products. However, even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some rulers, as in Kisar (South Moluccas), Nias (Sumatra), possessed hundreds of slaves outside large-scale market production. A further and infamous example is Bali where rulers employed sometimes 300 slaves as prostitutes.¹⁴ In summary, slavery was probably much more widespread than has generally been assumed. It flourished not only in urban centres, in export orientated agriculture and in mining, but was also ubiquitous in rural areas of the Archipelago where production for the international market was less important or even absent. The latter, data for which exists mainly in post-1800 sources, deserves more attention from researchers.

Slavery, Serfdom and Debt Bondage

It is also necessary to define the terms 'slave' and 'slavery'. In Java, for instance, where slavery was rare, other forms of servile labour may have been more important. Thus in reference to the Cirebon-Priangan area of West Java, Mason Hoadley estimates that in c.1700, about five per cent of the population were in bonded labour. The latter category refers to debt-bondage (Dutch: *pandelingschap*) or to a status between that of a slave and that of a debt bondman – a category for which Hoadley has no title. I suggest that we call these people 'serfs' (Dutch: *horigen*), people 'bound to the soil' or, in the Javanese context, to a person. We then have three categories of servile labour in Java: slaves, who can be bought and sold, serfs, who can neither be traded nor leave their masters, and debt bondmen and bondwomen who in principle can regain freedom by paying off their debts.¹⁵ Whereas slavery was rare outside the ports, in all likelihood there existed in Java an important group of debt bondmen and serfs. Sultan Agung, a famous ruler of Mataram in Central Java in the early seventeenth century, was probably instrumental in the creation of large groups of serfs. From various regions he conquered, large numbers of people were moved

to the area surrounding his capital. This forced migration sparked off at least one famine, and created a serf-like population. Two centuries later these people still comprised a separate group. Sultan Iskandar Muda, ruler of Aceh, a contemporary of Sultan Agung, conducted similar forced migrations from conquered territory in Kedah in Malaysia.

It is generally assumed that slavery reflects, among other factors, labour shortage in a context of an abundance of accessible land ('open resources').¹⁶ It could be argued that as these conditions were absent in Java by around 1600, slavery would have started to disappear there naturally. It is possible that Agung, with the creation of serfdom in his realm, contributed to this development. At that moment, Mataram was still a young state. When, after the activities of Sultan Agung, Mataram's reputation had been made, and the grip of the state on its subjects had been strengthened, rulers and aristocracy could probably get most things done by way of statute labour services. However, this did not apply to the urban centres where foreign merchants continued to rely on slaves. In Java, slavery in urban areas was restricted to non-Javanese, while from at least the late seventeenth century, it was also forbidden to hold Javanese bond-debtors in VOC territories. The latter ruling, which was frequently broken, was re-iterated until well into the nineteenth century.¹⁷

In other parts of Indonesia during the period under review, there also existed many people who the Dutch called 'slaves' but who in fact were neither 'slaves' nor 'freemen' and might most aptly be described as 'serfs'.¹⁸ The phrase 'free as a chicken' rather than 'free as a bird', used by the Sumatran Minangkabau, comes to mind. Such distinctions reflect a need for historians to be precise where many sources are vague. For instance, Ruibing, author of the only monograph on Indonesian slavery, notes that from 33 to 90 per cent of the population of some groups (Gorontalo, Toraja, Borneo) were slaves. However, closer examination of his sources reveal that these were often serfs rather than slaves.¹⁹ However, the numerous gradations of status between 'slave' and 'freeman' made it easier for descendants of the slaves to blend eventually, often through intermarriage, into the free population. On the other hand, the existence of groups of serfs living outside their lord's home and with minimal obligations towards him, in many cases led to the formation of separate clans. In such cases it was much more difficult to lose the collective 'ex-slave' label.

The Supply of Slaves

There can be no social formation even partly based on slavery if there is no regular supply of slaves and in Early Modern Indonesia a number of mechanisms ensured that supply; debts, conflicts (large and small scale),

raids, fines, and natural or manmade disasters.²⁰ Some authorities consider that debt was the main cause of slavery and bondage. People who had accumulated debts too large to be paid back within an acceptable time-span became debt-bondmen and, eventually, slaves. Three factors contributed to the near universality of debt in Indonesia; frequent climatic anomalies, a propensity for gambling, and high interest rates. Fines can be regarded as a subcategory of debt, as people who proved unable to pay fines could be enslaved. Indeed, in some societies the penalty for certain crimes was enslavement. It would appear that some capital crimes, such as those committed against a ruler, murder, adultery and incest, over time became punishable by enslavement or by such high fines that enslavement was inevitable.

It was also a society prone to inter-group conflict. This could range from full-scale national war, such as those fought by Sultan Agung and Iskandar Muda against their respective enemies, to frequent skirmishes amongst small local potentates or tribes. While male captives were often killed, females and children were usually sold as slaves. It could be argued that raiding is just another form of inter-group conflict, but most scholars treat it as a distinct category for whereas the latter were undertaken for the explicit purpose of acquiring slaves, the former were not. Raiding manifested itself in two forms, pirate or ‘sea-robber’ attacks, and expeditions against ‘primitive’ upland tribes. Pirates regularly attacked vulnerable coastal populations, while coastal ‘Malays’ raided inland tribes like the Kubu, Dayak, Toraja and Papuans.

Disasters, such as wars, harvest failures, epidemics, volcanic eruptions and cyclones, could take people to the brink of starvation. Often they came in pairs, as when epidemics followed wars, and volcanic eruptions provoked harvest failures. The sources reveal that many victims sold themselves, or their children and other members of their families into slavery. Some areas, particularly in what is now India, prone to a fifteen-year cycle of severe draught and harvest failure, proved fertile sources of slaves.

A major theme in the literature is the definition of a slave as an ‘alien’ or an ‘outsider’ from another group.²¹ This was often the case, as many slaves came from areas outside the Archipelago. VOC and Aceh traders purchased large numbers of slaves from India during famine years. The VOC also shipped slaves from Madagascar to the gold and silver mines of Salido near Padang in Sumatra, while Philippino slaves were sold in Borneo and elsewhere in the Archipelago. As already indicated, all slaves in Javanese coastal towns from 1600 were ‘outsiders’.

However, in some cases the point is highly debatable. For instance, could North Nias captives enslaved by a local potentate in South Nias be considered aliens, or Sumbawa neighbours captured by the ruler of Bima,

also living on one island? Even more questionable was the situation in Bali where, at the end of the nineteenth century, members of a family whose head died without adult male issue became slaves of the ruler. Moreover, as Ruibing conceded in the 1930s, a debt bondman turned slave in his own community could not be considered an 'alien'. Thus, if it is accepted that debt was the chief cause of enslavement, most slaves were not aliens – unless it can be proven that they were subsequently sold outside the community.

A Proposed 'Unified Field Theory'

Given such issues, is it possible to find some kind of 'unified field theory' to explain enslavement in Indonesian society? This involves the search less for a monocausal explanation than for a number of features that underlie Indonesian society and the different processes of enslavement – warfare, raiding, gambling, debt and exorbitant interest rates. Fundamental to Indonesian society were the natural hazards that made for a high degree of uncertainty in day-to-day life. As I have noted elsewhere, such hazards profoundly affected the agricultural cycle and the choices available to the peasant-cultivator. Harvest failures, cyclones, and volcanic eruptions (Tambora) and the famines and epidemics following in their wake occurred far more often than is generally realized.²² To avoid starvation, many were forced either to borrow money, or more often food and so become debtors, a process that could lead to enslavement, or to sell themselves or members of their family into slavery. The frequency and uncertainty of natural hazards may also have contributed to the propensity of many Indonesian peoples to gamble (a practice often associated with cockfighting). One cannot discount cultural traits, but given the frequency of natural disasters, life itself was a gamble and frugal behaviour was not at a premium.

Natural disasters may also have indirectly promoted enslavement through warfare and slave raiding. Indonesia was characterized by 'prebendal' ('soft' or 'contest') states, in which the power of the ruler was related to the size of his following. Rulers maintained the support of their followers through the disbursement of the state's taxable surplus. In bad years, they supplemented low tax revenue by launching military expeditions to pillage neighbouring polities. The VOC was also well versed in such tactics. Slave raiding by dissatisfied elements of the nobility often had a similar origin. In addition, prebendal states, unlike strong centralized states, failed to impose a monopoly of punishment and were thus incapable of preventing the substitution of enslavement for crimes previously punishable by fines and other penalties.

Finally, exorbitant interest rates were crucial in turning normal debts, incurred as a result of harvest failure, gambling and high bride prices, into virtually irredeemable debts. One reason for high interest rates was that many areas in the Archipelago were not fully monetized so that cash was always at a premium. As importantly, those with large quantities of money generally purchased slaves and cattle and hoarded the remainder by turning gold and silver into jewellery and by ‘burying’ it in hoards. All such purchases contained an element of ostentation, of status display, while hoarding removed money from circulation, which tended to drive interest rates up.²³

Alternative uses of money, such as buying land and constructing stone or brick houses as happened in Europe, were either unattractive or impossible in Indonesia. Often land could not be bought by individuals, at least in large quantities, as it was the property of lineages and clans. Landed property vested in clans is in part a feature of societies with a low population density, but a soft state would have reinforced this tendency. The lack of house construction is more puzzling, but can perhaps be explained, like gambling, by the uncertainty of life in face of natural catastrophes.

So, most slave-creating mechanisms were linked to three elements, the high frequency of natural hazards, low population densities, and the prevalence of soft states.

The Demographics of Slavery

Over the period under discussion, an annual average of possibly one to two thousand slaves were shipped to Indonesia predominantly from Madagascar, India and the Philippines. These are impressive numbers in terms of personal tragedies, but imported slaves made a negligible contribution to the Indonesian population, which in the mid-eighteenth century was probably around ten million. Moreover, a large percentage of slaves died en-route before reaching Indonesia. Slaves were also exported from Indonesia. In the sixteenth century Malacca and Patani had large communities of Javanese, mostly slaves and in the seventeenth century slaves were exported to Taiwan and the Cape. But again, these were negligible as a proportion of the Archipelago’s resident population.

Nevertheless I am prepared to argue that slavery on the whole had a negative effect on Indonesia’s population growth rates. This is based on the following considerations. Although there exists little statistical evidence, there is a consensus that prior to the nineteenth century population growth rates in Indonesia were low, in the region of 0.1 or 0.2 per cent per annum. There is less agreement on the causes, some scholars emphasizing wars as the sole cause for low population growth rates, others arguing that wars in

conjunction with the seventeenth century 'Little Ice Age' to be responsible, while yet others argue that additional factors such as natural hazards and epidemics should be taken into consideration.

I would add slavery as an important contributory factor to low population growth rates in pre-nineteenth century Indonesia. First, slave-owning societies have low birth rates. This is true both of slave-owners and of slaves themselves.²⁴ In fact, the need to have children who could be employed as workers is obviated by the possession of slaves. There are even cases where slavery shades imperceptibly into adoption, which makes the link between numbers of children and slaves even more plausible.²⁵ However, while slavery may have stopped some people from having (more) children, it may have kept people in the slave-exporting areas, such as Bali or Nias, from introducing (more) birth control measures. Indeed, many such areas, including in addition, Lombok, Bima, Macassar and the slave-exporting areas of India, also exported considerable quantities of rice (and cheap textiles?). These were signs of relatively high population densities and of mono-crop (rice), and therefore vulnerable economies. Could it be that in bad years these areas, instead of adopting birth control techniques, might have opted to export their population surplus?

Slaves also had high death rates. This was partly because they had been weakened by the trauma and voyage prior to reaching the market, and partly because once there, they entered a new disease environment. Indeed, as slaves often came from disease-stricken areas, they could themselves infect the resident population. There are, for instance, several cases of slaves introducing smallpox to their port of disembarkation. Slave raiding also entailed high mortality, as it was a widespread custom in the Indonesian Archipelago to kill most adult males encountered, and to enslave only women and children. This may help account for the higher cost there of male slaves.

At the same time, slavery may have kept alive people who otherwise would have perished. This was the case when people in famine stricken areas sold into slavery themselves and/or their family members. However, given the low productivity of slave labour, at least in the indigenous Indonesian context, this levelling mechanism probably made for lower agricultural productivity. This in turn made the general population more vulnerable during periods of climatic abnormality or warfare. Where slavery was perceived as a safety net during periods of dearth, the incentives for high productivity among the less well off may have been low.

Finally, there is a fascinating link between slave demography and high bride prices (*jujur*) – another under-researched topic.²⁶ In cases where slaves formed part of the bride price, the prospective son-in-law, too poor to pay such a price, often raided adjacent areas for slaves. High bride prices were

a contributory factor to indebtedness, and made for late marriages, and therefore, supposedly, for adultery and prostitution. Adultery, if discovered, led to high fines and often to slavery, while prostitution, which established a demand for female slaves as prostitutes, also led to a higher incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. It therefore contributed to sterility and stillbirths, which in turn resulted in lower population growth-rates.

Epilogue

I would suggest that in the Indonesian case slaves were neither a good investment nor the path to capitalism. In sparsely populated areas, the powerful might require slaves to generate a surplus. However, they used that surplus to demonstrate their status by acquiring more slaves and holding celebrations (feasts of merit) where much livestock (often buffalo) was slaughtered and eaten. Sometimes some slaves would also be sacrificed. The higher status thus acquired enabled the powerful to ask a higher bride price for their daughters. To obtain the slaves that often formed part of the bride price, large sums of money had to be borrowed, or a slave-raid launched. Buffalo herds formed an integral part of such a process, and slaves were required as tenders of cattle, as herders, and occasionally even to feed them in times of drought and to round up groups of semi-feral buffaloes. I propose to call this complicated phenomenon, with its many feedback loops, the ‘wealth-slavery-buffalo-feasting-bride price complex’.²⁷

In sum, most capital was sunk in livestock that would be primarily used for large feasts, in slaves who had, on average, a rather high mortality rate, rather low productivity, and who did not reproduce and kept their owners also from reproducing more vigorously, and in ‘hoards’ that were economically speaking equally sterile. A high frequency of natural hazards, low levels of population density, and ‘soft’ states were conducive to these mechanisms and together they made for very low growth rates of population and income per capita.

NOTES

1. The first version of this article was written at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, during the second semester of the academic year 1999/2000. I am deeply grateful to the NIAS staff who take great pride in creating a scholarly atmosphere conducive to reading, thinking and writing. Thanks are also due to Erwiza Erman, with whom I discussed the intricacies of Indonesian (mostly Sumatran) dependency relations in the past. I very much enjoyed the workshop in Avignon where the first version was presented, a laudable initiative of Gwyn Campbell, our gracious host there. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to David Henley, my colleague at KITLV, who not only gave detailed comments on the first draft, but also provided me with important references for the rewrite.

2. A.H. Ruibing, *Ethnologische Studie betreffende de Indonesische slavernij als maatschappelijk verschijnsel* (Zutphen: Thieme, 1937); B. Lasker, *Human Bondage in Southeast Asia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950); A. Reid (ed.), *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983); M. Klein (ed.), *Breaking the Chains; Slavery, Bondage, and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); G. Oostindie (ed.), *Fifty Years Later; Antislavery, Capitalism and Modernity in the Dutch Orbit* (Leiden: KITLV, 1995); G. Condominas (ed.), *Formes Extrêmes de Dépendance; Contributions à l'étude de l'esclavage en Asie du Sud-Est* (Paris: EHESS, 1998). Most contributions in the Condominas volume in fact date from the late 1970s or early 1980s.

In the four edited volumes cited above that date from the last two decades, nine articles were published on Indonesian areas, the majority in Reid, *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency*, which thus remains the best single buy for those interested in the history of Indonesian slavery.

3. For references to urban history studies up to 1991 see G.J. Knaap, 'Slavery and the Dutch in Southeast Asia', in Oostindie (ed.), *Fifty Years Later*, p.193. For works since then, see H.E. Niemeijer, 'Calvinisme en koloniale stadscultuur; Batavia 1619–1725', Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1996; R. Raben, 'Batavia and Colombo; The Ethnic and Spatial Order of Two Colonial Cities 1600–1800', Dissertation, Leiden University, 1996; and J. Talens, *Een feodale samenleving in koloniaal vaarwater. Staatsvorming, koloniale expansie en economische onderontwikkeling in Banten, West-Java (1600–1750)* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1999).
4. I have explored the notion of non-peasant labour, including slavery, in Indonesia prior to 1900 in a number of publications – see the following works by P. Boomgaard: *Children of the Colonial State; Population Growth and Economic Development in Java, 1795–1880* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989), pp.109–35; 'Why Work for Wages? Free Labour in Java, 1600–1900', *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands* 2 (1990), pp.37–56; 'The Non-agricultural side of an Agricultural Economy; Java, 1500–1900', in P. Alexander, P. Boomgaard and B. White (eds.), *In the Shadow of Agriculture; Non-farm Activities in the Javanese Economy, Past and Present* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991), pp.14–40; *Historicus in een papieren landschap*, inaugural lecture, University of Amsterdam (Leiden: KITLV, 1996), pp.18–23; 'Geld, krediet, rente en Europeanen in Zuid- en Zuidoost-Azië in de zeventiende eeuw', in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds.), *Kapitaal, ondernemerschap en beleid; Studies over economie en politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot heden. Afscheidsbundel voor Prof. Dr. P.W. Klein* (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1996), pp.500–505; 'Introducing environmental histories of Indonesia', in P. Boomgaard, F. Colombijn and D. Henley (eds.), *Paper Landscapes; Explorations in the environmental history of Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV, 1997), pp.7–9.
5. J.F. Warren, *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898; The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981).
6. A. Cortesão, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires; An Account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512–1515* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), pp.139–227.
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8. See Boomgaard, 'Why work for wages?' and 'The non-agricultural side'.
9. W.P. Coolhaas et al. (eds.), *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* 9 Vols. ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1960–88), Vol. II (1964), p.269; P.A. Leupe, 'Besognes der Hooge Regeering te Batavia gehouden over de Commissie van Paravicini naar Timor 1756', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 25 (1877), p.459.
10. Coolhaas et al. (eds.), *Generale Missiven* III, p.281; W. van Hogendorp, 'Beschrijving van

- het eiland Timor', *Verhandelingen Bataviaasch Genootschap* 1 (1779), p.296; J.A. du Bois, 'De Lampongsche distrikten op het eiland Sumatra', *Tijdschrift Nederlandsch-Indië* 14,1 (1852), p.319; H.F.W. Cornets de Groot, 'Nota over de slavernij en het pandelingschap in de residentie Lampongsche Districten', *Tijdschrift Bataviaasch Genootschap* 27 (1882), p.458.
11. Coolhaas et al. (eds.), *Generale Missiven* V (1975), p.288; Ruibing, *Ethnologische Studie*, pp.38–42; W. Foster (ed.), *The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas 1604–1606* (Nendeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1967), pp.95, 171; V.T. King, *The Maloh of West Kalimantan. An ethnographic study of social inequality and social change among an Indonesian Borneo people* (Dordrecht/Cinnaminson: Foris, 1985), p.53.
 12. See e.g. A.C. Kruyt, 'De slavernij in Posso (Midden-Celebes)', *Onze Eeuw; Maandschrift voor Staatkunde, Letteren, Wetenschap en Kunst*, 11,1 (1911), p.67.
 13. Cornets de Groot, 'Nota over de slavernij', p.458; A.W. Nieuwenhuis, *Animisme, Spiritisme en Fetisisme onder de volken van den Nederlandsch-Indischen Archipel* (Baarn: Hollandia-Drukkerij, 1911), pp.40–42; W.F. Funke, *Orang Abung; Volkstum Süd-Sumatras im Wandel*, Vol. II (Leiden: Brill, 1961), pp.277–81; Warren, *The Sulu Zone*, p.199; King, *The Maloh of West Kalimantan*, pp.53, 87–8.
 14. J. Jacobs, *Eenigen tijd onder de Baliërs. Eene reisbeschrijving met aantekeningen betreffende hygiëne, land- en volkenkunde van de eilanden Bali en Lombok* (Batavia: Kolff, 1883), p.124; T.C. Rappard, 'Het eiland Nias en zijne bewoners', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 62 (1909), p.603; Ruibing, *Ethnologische Studie*, p.30.
 15. M. Hoadley, 'Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Pre-Colonial Java: the Cirebon-Priangan Region, 1700', in Reid, *Slavery*, p.115. On *pandelingschap* see e.g. A.W.C. Verwey, 'Iets over het contractueel pandelingschap en de bestrijding dezer instelling in de Nederlandsch-Indische wetgeving', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 42 (1893), pp.234–53.
 16. The *opus classicum* here is H.J. Nieboer, *Slavery as an Industrial System; Ethnological Researches* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1900).
 17. Verwey, 'Iets over het contractueel pandelingschap', pp.251–3; F. de Haan, *Priangan: De Preanger-Regentschappen onder het Nederlandsche Bestuur tot 1811*, Vol.III (Batavia: Kolff, 1912), pp.209–10, 442; J. Fox, "'For Good and Sufficient Reasons': An Examination of Early Dutch East India Company Ordinances on Slaves and Slavery", in Reid, *Slavery*, pp.246–62.
 18. Two terms are found in the Dutch sources on the Archipelago predating the nineteenth century, namely *slaaf* and *lijfeygene*, but there does not seem to be any difference in meaning between them.
 19. A.W.P. Verkerk Pistorius, 'Iets over de slaven en de afstammelingen van slaven in de Padangsche Bovenlanden', *Tijdschrift Nederlandsch-Indië*, 3rd series, 2,1 (1868), p.437; M. Moszkowski, *Auf neuen Wegen durch Sumatra; Forschungsreisen in Ost- und Zentral-Sumatra* (1907) (Berlin: Reimer, 1909), p.151; Ruibing, *Ethnologische Studie*, pp.32–8.
 20. There is a broad consensus on the points listed here, but the phrasing of these points is mine and might not please everyone.
 21. See e.g. Ruibing, *Ethnologische Studie*, p.7; Reid, *Slavery*, p.4.
 22. P. Boomgaard, 'Fluctuations in Mortality in 17th-century Indonesia', in Ts'ui-jung Liu et al. (eds.), *Asian Population History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.191–220.
 23. For a more detailed discussion of these topics, see Boomgaard, 'Geld, krediet, rente'.
 24. Although the evidence for 'Malay' societies is somewhat patchy. See Coolhaas et al. (eds.), *Generale Missiven*, IV (1971), p.554; G.J. Knaap, *Kruidnagelen en Christenen; De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696* (Dordrecht/Providence: Foris, 1987), p.132; Raben, *Batavia and Colombo*, p.128; Kruyt, 'De slavernij in Posso', pp.91–2. For Africa and the Caribbean the evidence is better; see e.g. C.C. Robertson and M.A. Klein (eds.), *Women and Slavery in Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); C. Meillassoux, *Anthropologie de l'esclavage; Le ventre de fer et d'argent* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); M.A. Klein, 'The Demography of Slavery in Western Soudan; The Late Nineteenth Century', in D.D. Cordell and J.W. Gregory (eds.), *African Population and Capitalism; Historical Perspectives* (Boulder/London: Westview Press, 1987), pp.50–61; B.W. Higman, *Slave Populations of the British*

- Caribbean, 1807–1834* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); A. van Stipriaan, *Surinaams contrast; Roofbouw en overleven in een Caraïbische plantagekolonie 1750–1863* (Leiden: KITLV, 1993), pp.333–40.
25. Cornets de Groot, 'Nota over de slavernij', p.476.
 26. See Boomgaard, *Historicus in een papieren landschap*, pp.18–23 for a fuller treatment.
 27. The role of livestock in this complex is dealt with in P. Boomgaard, 'The Age of the Buffalo; The Maritime Trade in Livestock in Asia, Particularly Indonesia, 1500–1850', paper written for the panel 'History of Foodcrop Production and Animal Husbandry in Southeast Asia', London: Euroseas, 2001.